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he promotion of free trade is one of the oldest policy implications offered by 
international economic theory.  While significant disconnects have historically 
existed between the politics and the economics of trade policy, the rapid economic 
growth experienced by the export-oriented Asian countries during the 1960s and 1970s 
amidst a largely stagnating and trade-restrictive developing world provided a precedent for 
effective development policy, especially within the world’s less developed countries 
(LDCs).  Free trade arguments have since been championed by a majority of global 
institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF hereafter), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD hereafter), and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO hereafter). The argument goes that a reduction in trade barriers will 
induce greater economic efficiency within LDCs by offering cheaper world prices to 
domestic consumers (increasing consumer welfare) while creating conditions of 
competition for domestic producers (forcing domestic production to shift towards the most 
efficient sectors based upon availability of domestic factors). 
T 
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Egypt represents a striking example of an LDC that has recently transitioned from a 
closed to an open economy in the hopes of creating conditions for increased economic 
development.   Since embarking upon a campaign of neoliberal reforms during the early 
1990s, Egypt has slashed its average tariff rates from >30% to 6.4%, with additional non-
tariff barriers also experiencing significant reductions.1  It may come as no surprise that 
Egypt has also made some of the most significant strides in increasing economic growth, 
effectively doubling its percentages of real GDP growth (3.2% to 6%) and nominal 
GDP/capita growth ($1,197 to $2,652) since trade barriers were aggressively eliminated in 
2002.2  Such preliminary evidence seems to support the common assumption that trade 
liberalization promotes economic growth.   
 Yet correlation does not imply causation, a truism that necessarily provokes the 
need for a deeper understanding of Egypt’s experience with liberalization and growth.  This 
paper attempts to critically examine the connection between trade openness and growth 
through a comprehensive analysis of economic liberalization in Egypt over the last decade.  
The necessity of such an inquiry rests in the realization that growth is an aggregation of 
many economic factors, none of which can be held constant if the sum is to be properly 
understood.  This paper will attempt to argue that trade liberalization, despite paralleling 
economic growth increases, cannot be conclusively observed as a causal influence of 
economic growth in Egypt. 
 
Section I: History 
An examination of trade liberalization in Egypt requires a brief historical survey of 
Egypt’s protectionist past.  The military coup of 1952 brought Gamal Abdal Nasser to 
political power over a largely agrarian Egyptian state tied economically, politically, and 
socially to the liberal traditions of Great Britain.  Nasser quickly gained widespread popular 
support through his promises of severing imperial influence through the expansion of 
industry within the economy, social justice and democracy within the political system, and 
Arab nationalism throughout the region.  The realization of economic and political 
transformation began in 1956 when land reforms were initiated to transfer private land from 
the elites to the general population.  This was followed by nationalization of all banks and 
foreign firms, as well as the Suez Canal.  With the economy effectively nationalized by 
1959, Nasser proceeded with the first industrial five-year plan, which was designed to 
stimulate growth and modernize Egypt.  By the time the Egyptian economy began to 
experience economic shortfall in the late 1960s, Nasser’s Egyptian Socialist Party (ESP) 
had assumed authoritarian control over 75 percent of industrial output and 90 percent of all 
new investment in industry.3 
                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence Unit. “Country Commerce: Egypt.” Economist Intelligence Unit,  New York, 
NY, (2008). 
2 International Monetary Fund. “IMF Data Mapper.” http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php.  
3 Iliya Harik, Economic Policy Reform in Egypt (Jacksonville: University of Florida Press, 1997): p. 18. 
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 Anwar Sadat inherited the stagnating Egyptian state in 1971, and made an early 
realization that liberal reform was an economic necessity.  Yet, many scholars have argued 
that Sadat’s economic opening did little more than turn Egypt into a rentier economy, 
dependent upon oil, remittances, tourism, and foreign aid.  The existence of such rents 
provided the capital necessary to maintain trade barriers for domestic industry and subsidies 
for overpriced consumer goods.  Hosni Mubarak took the presidential helm in 1981 
following the assassination of Sadat, and continued to oppose liberalization despite 
increasing levels of inflation and foreign debt.  This strategy induced near economic 
collapse when the Gulf War severed Egypt from two of its prized sectors, tourism and Gulf 
remittances. 
With economic options shrinking before their eyes, the Egyptian government sought 
the help of the IMF in 1991.  The resulting agreement, Egypt’s Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program (ERSAP), awarded Egypt an 18-month loan worth 278 million SDR 
(special drawing rights) contingent upon the adoption of neoliberal reforms to help create 
macroeconomic stability.  Egypt had great success with the reforms, registering one of the 
largest fiscal adjustments to date.  The government also attempted limited privatization by 
putting 314 public companies up for sale in an effort to thin the state apparatus.  The 
financial sector also experienced reforms, with interest rate ceilings removed in an effort to 
battle inflation.  Trade liberalization represented one of the few issues mostly unaddressed 
by the Egyptian state during this period of reform.  While tariff ranges were reduced from 
10-80% to 5-40% percent, the system remained significantly constrained by excessive non-
tariff barriers.4 
The issue of trade openness entered the limelight in 2001 when the government 
“declared export expansion to be a matter of life and death.”5  The Economist Intelligence 
Unit observes that aggressive measures were taken beginning in 2004 to strip trade barriers 
from the Egyptian economy, with the official tariff rate reduced from 14.6% to 9% on 
around 6,500 imported items.  In an effort to aid domestic industry, customs ceilings were 
reduced from 104% to 40%, with duties halved for raw materials and completely eliminated 
for machinery.6  Egypt’s notoriously oppressive system of procedures and contracts were 
simplified during this time as well, reducing storage time for imported goods from 28 days 
to two days.7  Further measures were taken in 2007 to reduce the weighted tariff average on 
imports from 9% to 6.9%.8  Egypt has received international praise for the above-mentioned 
efforts and has been awarded top-10 global reformer honors in the World Bank’s Doing 
                                                 
4 Gouda Abdel-Khalek, Stabilization and Adjustment in Egypt: Reform or De-Industrialization? (United 
Kingdom: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2001): p. 56. 
5 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Commerce: Egypt,” p. 92. 




7 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Commerce: Egypt,” p. 92. 
8 United States Trade Representative, “Trade Summary.” 
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Business Report three of the last four years, which was propelled largely by its trade rank 
improvement from 83rd to 24th in the world (now ahead of such countries as the United 
Kingdom, Taiwan, and Luxembourg).9  Such improvements are significant, considering the 
fact that the WTO viewed Egypt’s tariff system as “complex” and displaying “high 
effective protection” in 2005.10 
 
Section II: Theory 
 The positive relationship between trade liberalization and growth was embedded 
within theoretical assumption for nearly the first two hundred years of classical economic 
theory.  The question that was often addressed was “how can a country benefit from trade?”  
While the answers provided by Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1817), Eli Heckscher 
and Bertil Ohlin (1911), and Paul Samuelson (1936) varied considerably, each of them 
elevated free trade to the realm of assumption, alongside perfectly competitive markets and 
similar demand preferences.  While few countries have ever approached free trade 
perfectly, Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld explain that free trade was nonetheless 
advocated as an “ideal toward which trade policy should strive.”11   
Trade liberalization represents the ideal policy prescription because the economic 
benefits of free trade are relatively easy to illustrate (see Figure 1).  Countries are generally 
confronted with two prices for a good within the global economy: the domestic price and 
the world price.  If the world price (P2) is lower than the domestic price (P1), then domestic 
consumers will purchase the good at an increased equilibrium quantity, shown in Figure 1 
at point Q4.  The imposition of an import tax (tariff) by the domestic government will 
increase the world price of a good by a certain amount, resulting in price P3.  This 
imposition will increase government revenue  by the product of total imports following the 
tariff (Q3 – Q2) and the difference between world price (P2) and world price + tariff (P3).  
Domestic producers will also benefit since the world price + tariff allows for a shift in 
domestic production from Q1 to Q2 at a higher price.  Yet these increases will come at a 
comparatively larger loss to consumer surplus, since all consumers are forced to pay a 
higher price for the good being taxed, resulting in a total welfare loss of the two DWL 
triangles in Figure 1. 
 
 
                                                 
9 World Bank, “Doing Business 2009: Comparing Regulation in 181,” International Bank for 
Reconstruction/World Bank, 2009. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/FullReport/2009/DB_2009_English.pdf.  
10 WTO Secretariat, “Trade Policy Review Egypt: Report by the Secretariat,” World Trade Organization 
WT/TRP/S/150, 28 June 2005, p. viii. 
11 Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 5th Edition (New 
York: Addison-Wesley, 2000): p. 218. 
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In addition to the assertion that free trade best promotes the efficient allocation of 
resources, free trade has also been argued to create additional long-run benefits such as 
economies of scale, growth externalities through technology transfer, and increased 
productivity as prices for intermediate goods decrease.  Economies of scale refer to 
industries that require a very large volume of production before the lowest average cost 
(AC) is reached.  Rudiger Dornbush explains that such industries are unlikely to arise in an 
environment of trade protection based on the fact that such industries require large markets 
to be efficient, which often escape the closed economy which is more concerned with 
domestic consumption.12  Growth externalities refer to the production benefits that may 
result from the incorporation of new technologies received through increased interaction 
with foreign countries.  Therefore, “‘free trade’ offers more opportunities for learning and 
innovation than are provided by a system of ‘managed’ trade.”13  Finally, Paul Romer 
(1989) has argued that free trade allows for a greater variety of intermediate inputs to enter 
the market, potentially expanding an LDC’s production possibility curve through the influx 
of capital goods used for assembly production. 
 Despite free trade producing numerous theoretical benefits, economists have 
highlighted several reasons why free trade may not be a desirable policy including: the 
prevalence of market failures, the need to support infant industries, and political risk.  
                                                 
12 Rudiger Dornbush, “The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992): pp. 73-77. 
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Krugman effectively theorizes the market failure argument, stating that a “hands-off policy 
is desirable (free trade) in any one market only if all other markets are working properly.  If 
they are not working properly, a government intervention, which appears to distort 
incentives in one market, may actually increase welfare by offsetting the consequences of 
market failures elsewhere” (emphasis mine).14  Krugman uses the example that an 
economically inefficient subsidy for labor-intensive industries may reap large social 
rewards if unemployment is high.15  Dani Rodrik offers the example that Brazil could 
potentially benefit from tax increases if the increased revenue is funneled into investment 
projects that yield returns larger than the initial loss in consumer surplus caused by the 
tax.16  The logic behind this approach is one of “second-best,” accepting that government 
intervention is necessary based on the reality that domestic economies can never be free of 
imperfections. 
 The infant industry argument revolves around the idea that trade protection is 
necessary in order to grant domestic industries adequate time to develop prior to competing 
with more mature industries in more developed countries (MDCs).  Such ideas inspired the 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies of the 1950s and 1960s that combined 
heavy trade protection and exchange rate controls in order to provide cheap capital imports 
to domestic industries.  A prolonged critique of ISI would be superfluous, considering it has 
been, for the most part, universally discredited.  Nevertheless, the infant industry has 
remained widely discussed, due to the huge successes of the export-focused economies of 
East and Southeast Asian.  By encouraging heavily protected industries to produce for 
world markets, the Asian economies have avoided the moral hazard problem that plagued 
domestic-oriented industries in countries that supported ISI.  A final argument for trade 
protection arises through politics.  While this aspect will not be examined further, it is 
nonetheless important to mention that trade policy cannot be detached from the political 
process (particularly in societies with highly influential interest groups). 
 
Section III:  Literature Review 
 This paper will address two different sets of literature, with the first including the 
recent empirical work addressing the relationship between trade openness and economic 
growth, and the second covering the recent literature on Egypt’s liberalization experience 
since the IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program in 1992.  Robert Baldwin’s 
“Openness and Growth” offers the most recent and comprehensive survey of the literature 
                                                 
14 Ibid: p. 225. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, and Andres Velasco, “Growth Diagnostics,” NBER Working Paper 
(2005). http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/growth_accelerations_aug05.pdf.  For an abbreviated 
version, check Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik and Andres Velasco, “Getting the Diagnosis Right,” 
Finance and Development, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2006), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/03/hausmann.htm. 
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on the empirical relationship between openness and growth.17  Baldwin observes that such 
literature has grown immensely since the 1970s for two reasons: (1) free trade arguments 
found few followers during the heavily protectionist interwar and post-colonial periods, and 
(2) the simultaneous failure of ISI and success of export-oriented Asian economies set the 
stage for a reassessment of free trade.  Baldwin identifies the first wave of studies as mostly 
econometric, with Balassa (1971, 1978) being one of the first to find a positive relationship 
between trade openness and growth.  These studies were supported by other prominent 
scholars, including Krueger (1978) and Bhagwati (1978).  While the above works observed 
a positive relationship between trade openness and growth, Baldwin mentions that many of 
these scholars qualified their findings with the concession that factors promoting growth 
proved numerous, complicating the process of isolating the trade/growth relationship.  
Criticisms eventually emerged from Edwards (1993) and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001), 
effectively discrediting the early econometric approaches. 
 The current debate now involves what Baldwin terms “sophisticated cross-country 
studies.”18  One such study was conducted by Dollar (1992), which concluded that trade 
distortions combined with exchange rate volatility led to lower per capita GDP levels.19  
Easterly (1989, 1993) found that trade protection has an adverse effect on capital 
accumulation, which is likely to hamper economic growth.20  Sachs and Warner (1995) 
offer one of the most robust studies to date.  After controlling for relatively few variables 
and adding complexity to the liberalization process (by distinguishing five kinds of trade 
barriers), they find that a positive and significant correlation exists between openness and 
growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) add geography into the equation, concluding that trade 
openness and growth are positively correlated in regions with higher country densities. 
 The strongest critique to the above positions has been offered by Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2001).  From the outset, Rodriguez and Rodrik highlight the important distinction 
between ‘export levels vs. growth’ and ‘openness vs. growth.’  Their analysis concludes 
that a strong correlation does in fact exist between export increases and growth, but that the 
connection between openness and growth remains “fragile”.21  Even pro-trade scholars such 
as Krueger (1978) have conceded that the openness-growth connection is plagued by 
ambiguity due to the multitude of factors that can account for growth.  This tenuous 
connection has been further emphasized in studies that have shown that trade openness can 
have a negative effect on growth in certain circumstances.  Rodriguez and Rodrik explain 
that “Grossman and Helpman (1991), Feenstra (1990), Matsuyama (1992), and others have 
                                                 
17 Robert Baldwin, “Openness and Growth: What’s the Empirical Relationship?” NBER Working Paper 
9578 (Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003): pp. 1-34. 
18 Ibid: p. 18. 
19 Ibid: p. 19. 
20 James Cassing and Stephen Tokarick, “Trade and Growth in the Presence of Distortions,” IMF 
Working Paper WP/05/12, (January 2005): p. 3. 
21 Francisco Rodriquez and Dani Rodrik, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the 
Cross-National Evidence,” in Ben Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 
(Cambridge), 2001: pp. 315. 
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worked out examples where a country that is behind in technological development can be 
driven by trade to specialize in traditional goods and experience a reduction in its long-run 
rate of growth.”22  Rodrik (2008) concludes elsewhere that restrictive trade policies often 
receive the brunt of international criticism, when the “true culprits [of poor growth] are 
ineffective institutions, geographic determinants, or inappropriate macroeconomic 
policies.”23 
 The literature on Egypt’s experience with economic liberalization can be temporally 
divided between the period of structural adjustment and the period of liberalization 
following adjustment.  Scholars that have been fascinated by Egypt’s experience with 
structural adjustment include Harik (1997), Richards and Waterbury (2008), Subramanian 
(1997), Zaki (2001), Abdel-Khalek (2001), and Adams Jr. (2000).  These scholars all argue 
that structural adjustment offered numerous economic benefits, and helped Egypt exit a 
very precarious economic situation in which the twin deficits of trade and government debt 
were astronomical.  These authors seem less inclined to comment on the future of 
liberalization, but instead simply emphasize the economic necessity for reform that emerged 
in the early 1990s. 
The majority of the scholarship on post-adjustment in Egypt has focused upon the 
successes of economic liberalization.  On the issue of trade, Galal and Lawrence (1997, 
2005) argue that Egypt’s performance in reducing tariffs warrants a free-trade agreement 
with the United States.  Madani and Olarreaga (2002) take a more tentative position, 
arguing that trade protection remains a deeply nested aspect of the Egyptian political 
economy.  Soderling (2005) claims that trade relations may be a more significant problem 
than trade restrictions, arguing that Egypt should move away from its inefficient trade 
relationship with the United States and focus more upon developing relations with the 
European Union.  Omran (2007) and Ford (2008) observe that Egypt’s financial sector has 
been one of the fastest growing in the world, offering powerful new avenues for investment.  
Applications of the binding constraints approach articulated by Rodrik, Hausmann, and 
Velasco (2005) have been undertaken by Dobronogov and Iqbal (2005) and Enders (2007), 
with the former concluding that Egypt is prepared to explore new avenues of financing 
development from abroad while the latter contends that the low appropriability of returns 
caused by macroeconomic inefficiency and corruption remain primary concerns. 
 While many aspects of Egypt’s liberalization experience have been examined, there 
has not been a detailed understanding of trade openness and its relationship to growth.  
Dobroganov and Iqbal (2005) and Enders (2007) approach policy prescriptions that address 
trade openness, but choose not to explicitly highlight trade liberalization as a primary 
engine for economic development.  This paper will hopefully explain such a gap in the 
                                                 
22 Ibid, p. 269. 
23 Dani Rodrik, “Trading in Illustions.” The Economic Development Reader. Ed. Giorgio Secondi 
(London: Routledge, 2008): p. 464. 
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literature by highlighting the complexity inherent to the openness-growth debate in the case 
of Egypt. 
 
Section IV: Methodology 
 The following case study will proceed in two parts.  The first part will isolate 
growth statistics and trade barrier levels in an effort to observe the existing correlation 
between growth and trade openness.  This is important in order to initially approach the 
relationship in question.  The second part will reintroduce alternative growth variables such 
as foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial liberalization.  The intent of this move is to 
acknowledge the complexity in determining influences of economic growth.  If trade 
openness has had a dramatic impact upon Egypt’s economic growth, the factors of FDI and 
financial liberalization must be shown to have minimal influence.  It should be noted that 
this paper does not attempt to approach the openness-growth relationship in a 
mathematically complex way – rather, it is intended to offer a surface-level case-study 
analysis that is digestible for the average reader.  Yet, such reliance upon observation and 
description should in no way diminish the analytical conclusions of this work.  The hope is 
that this approach simply offers a different kind of knowledge that can supplement cross-
country econometric models that construct complexity upon a foundation of over-
simplification. 
 
Section V: Evidence on Openness and Growth 
 The charts below differently illustrate the relationship between trade liberalization 
and real GDP growth in Egypt.  Figure 2 compares simple average tariffs to real GDP 
growth.  Unfortunately, gaps exist in the available data at the WTO, but it appears that a 
general trend can be observed of diminishing trade barriers amidst rising growth rates.  
Figure 3 offers a comparison between weighted tariff averages (ratio of total tariff revenue 
and total value of imports) and real GDP growth.  While the data set is slightly incomplete, 
a similar relationship can be distinguished between declining weighted tariff levels and 
increasing real GDP growth over the time in question. 
 
10
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Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between real GDP growth and the Heritage 
Foundation’s trade openness ranking, which is a composite score between 0 and 100 based 
on weighted tariff averages and non-tariff barriers (NTBs).26  The graph indicates that trade 
openness remained fairly static during Egypt’s most pronounced period of real GDP growth 
(2003-2007).  Such data can only suggest a mild to insubstantial relationship between trade 
openness and growth. 
                                                 
24 Data was obtained from WTO Secretariat reports and the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
25 Data was obtained by successive reports provided by the United States Trade Representative and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, United States Trade Representative, “Trade Summary,” 2005-2008. 
26 The Heritage Foundation, “Methodology for the 10 Economic Freedoms. 
http://www.heritage.org/index/PDF/Index09_Methodology.pdf. 
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Figure 5 presents the connection between real GDP growth and the World Bank’s 
“trading across borders” rank, which is assigned to each country based on the combination 
of additional costs and total delays that accrue during the transit of an average good.28  
Unfortunately, the World Bank only began ranking this category in 2006, so the dataset is 
extremely limited.  While it may prove useful in the future, the given chart shows that real 
GDP growth has declined as trade openness has increased.  Considering the fact that the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Rank and the Heritage Foundation’s “trade openness” score 
are somewhat subjective measures, it remains significant that the Figure’s 2 and 3 illustrate 
a positive relationship between tariff reduction and growth increases, since tariff levels are 
much more quantifiable measurements.  
                                                 
27 It should be noted that the Doing Business Rank has been multiplied by a factor of 0.1 in order to 
condense data points.  Data compiled from successive years of the Doing Business Report, with the most 
recent data in World Bank. “Doing Business 2009: Comparing Regulation in 181 Economies.” 
International Bank for Reconstruction/World Bank, 2009: p. 101. 
28 World Bank, “Trading Across Borders Methodology.”  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/TradingAcrossBorders.aspx.  
12




INTERNATIONAL TRADE AS AN ENGINE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH REVISITED:   
A CASE OF EGYPT 
 






Section VI: Alternative Factors 
 The following pages will briefly address other possible factors that could have 
contributed to growth in Egypt between 2002 and 2008, including foreign direct investment 
(FDI), financial market expansion, and privatization.  FDI, referring mainly to fixed capital 
inflows in the form of foreign businesses and infrastructure, has been a highly important 
(and controversial) factor for LDC development over the last four decades (that has not 
depended upon an open trade regime).  Krugman and Obstfeld observe that rapid growth in 
Thailand during the 1990s occurred despite heavy trade barriers, likely due to Thailand’s 
ability to attract foreign businesses to help establish productive export outlets.30  IMF data 
show that China’s rapid growth during the 1990s paralleled an increase in FDI from $3.5 
billion to nearly $40 billion annually, offering further evidence for FDI’s potential influence 
on growth.  Figure 6 indicates that Egypt’s growth at the beginning of the 21st century 
corresponds closely with substantial increases in FDI from $1 billion to $10 billion annually 
over the course of three years.  Considering the fact that Egypt’s total exports in 2006 
amounted to just over $35 billion, it is clear that the influx of FDI was highly significant.  
While portfolio investment registered minimal increases over the same period of time, it is a 
significant observable due to Egypt’s past inability to bring in any foreign investment.  Both 
FDI and portfolio investment help to increase the stock of capital in a domestic economy, 
and thereby create investment opportunities that can stimulate growth. 
                                                 
29 It should be noted that the Heritage Foundation trade openness score has been multiplied by a factor of 
0.1 for the purposes of providing effective graphic interpretation (since real GDP growth is generally 
always within 0 and 10.  Heritage Foundation. “The 2009 Index of Economic Freedom.” Heritage 
Foundation and Wall Street Journal, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/index/. 
30 Krugman, International Economics, p. 268. 
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Financial markets are another effective medium for capital mobilization and 
increased investment.  If a country can successfully establish a credible stock market where 
money can freely flow through the economy, domestic businesses have increased 
opportunities to fund investment projects that can create growth.  As can be seen below in 
Figure 6, the Egyptian stock market soared between 2003 and 2007 (years which 
correspond with an increase in real GDP growth from 3.2% to 7.1%).  The crash of the 
CASE 30 in 2007 also parallels a slight decline in GDP growth in Egypt (projected to be 
6% in 2009), further linking financial performance and growth levels.  Additional financial 
reforms occurred in the banking sector, with two of the four major state-owned banks 
privatized in 2005.  Such reforms have provided additional capital opportunities for 
individuals and businesses that previously had to work within the inefficiencies of the state 
credit system. 
Finally, trade volume data further complicates the positive relationship between 
trade openness and growth.  Considering the fact that export increases have been shown to 
correspond closely with positive growth, the hope would be that trade liberalization would 
stimulate an increase in exports.  Unfortunately, as can be seen in Figure 8, while total 
exports have increased quite significantly over the last four years, exports as a share of total 
GDP have actually declined slightly, from 34% to 30%.  This indicates that exports are 
growing slightly slower than the entire economy, which offers evidence that other factors 
must have significantly contributed to Egypt’s recent episode of growth. 
 
                                                 
31 IMF, “IMF Data Mapper.” 
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 If anything has likely responded to the recent trade liberalization in Egypt, it has 
been import volume.  Egypt has been plagued by trade deficits since its initial liberalization 
campaign in the 1970s eventually led to a trade deficit that exceeded 100% of GDP.  While 
structural adjustment during the 1990s virtually eliminated the trade imbalance, it appears 
to be increasing once again in response to the falling barriers.  So far this deficit has been 
compensated for by other factors, but it remains disconcerting that trade liberalization has 
influenced imports more than exports, considering that exports have been a factor closely 
correlated with increased growth.  Figure 9 offers a look at Egypt’s trade balance, which 
has gone increasingly negative since 2003, when a trade surplus was actually attained.  
                                                 
32 Egyptian Stock Exchange, http://www.egyptse.com/index.asp?CurPage=CASE_30_Data1M.asp.  
33 IMF, “IMF Data Mapper.” 
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Section VII: Conclusion and Summary 
 The benefits of free trade are self-evident within a theoretical model of the world 
economy.  Yet, based on the fact that economists continue to debate the practical benefits of 
free trade, it is clear that there still exists a disconnect between the real world and the 
theoretical model.  This paper has attempted to contribute to this debate by focusing 
exclusively on Egypt.  When all other variables are held constant, the positive relationship 
between growth and various trade openness measures appears to exist.  It was shown that 
the tariff/growth relationship demonstrated a positive trend, while the more subjective 
openness/growth relationship proved inconclusive.  The relative ambiguity of these trends is 
made more apparent following the reintroduction of alternative growth factors such as FDI 
and financial liberalization.  Both of these factors clearly influenced economic growth 
during the same period of time that trade was liberalized, thus complicating the ability to 
observe causal impact.  Additionally, trade liberalization appears to have promoted imports 
more than exports in Egypt – a result that runs counter to the export/growth relationship that 
has shown great success in East and Southeast Asia. 
 It should be stated that this paper is not intended to stand as a critique of free trade 
policies.  Free trade certainly exists as an important piece to the puzzle of economic growth.  
The challenge is determining how big that piece actually is.  Until more advanced models 
and a more complete understanding can be reached, LDCs will likely continue to grow in 
second-best ways, the reality being that all economies are more imperfect than perfect.  
Does this mean that free trade should not be advocated?  The proper answer would likely be 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
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the classically indeterminate “it depends.” Considering that the benefits of free trade can be 
numerous, especially if government intervention in the economy is limited, it is safe to say 
that free trade, despite its ambiguous link with economic growth in LDCs, can still be a 
long-term “ideal toward which trade policy should strive.”35 
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